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FOREWARD
Forty years after the development of the first atomic weapons a new 
generation of Asian, African and Latin American decision-makers is debating 
a question which stems from the fateful destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki should they "go nuclear”? The following study by Mr Rashid Naim 
is a unique contribution to this debate Coolly and dispassionately, it 
surveys the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia, and the likelihood 
that such war (in one of several incarnations) might occur It thus adds a 
dimension of terrifying realism to the political and strategic debate held 
in the region — and now in the U S Congress—  over the prospects of 
nuclear proliferation While Mr Naim has carefully restricted the scope 
of his study, what does emerge is a vision of regional proliferation quite 
unlike any yet presented in the literature a reasonably stable system (at 
least no more unstable than the U S -Soviet relationship), with enormous 
and deadly costs facing both sides should it break down For better or 
worse, South Asian decision-makers still have the choice of 
non-proliferation before them This study will materially assist them (and 
their foreign friends and critics) m  comprehending the consequences of 1 
their actions
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2INTRODUCTION
This study evaluates the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons by 
India and Pakistan against each other, discusses the likely scenarios in 
such an exchange, and estimates the likely subsequent damage It might 
seem a display of bloodthirstiness to examine such issues even before 
Pakistan has carried out a test explosion, or before there is concrete 
evidence that either India or Pakistan is actually building nuclear 
weapons However, the fact remains that these developments may occur soon 
In the absence of a study of the kind undertaken here no complete analysis 
of the consequences of regional nuclear proliferation can be made
We do recognise that developing a workable bomb is not enough Both 
countries, especially Pakistan, have a long way to go towards developing 
effective delivery systems along with command and control mechanisms to 
enable use and control of any weapons they develop or acquire However, 
this study excludes discussion of such issues We shall assume that both 
countries will succeed in either adapting the military hardware they 
possess for these purposes or developing/acquiring the necessary delivery 
and c3l (command, control, communication and intelligence) systems The 
likelihood of a pre-emptive strike by India to prevent Pakistan from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon capability cannot be ruled out,1 and again we 
will assume that this will not happen
3Since this study is, to a large degree, an exercise in 
scenario-building, our general assumptions must be stated These are as 
follows
1 Pakistan carries out a successful nuclear test explosion
2 Both India and Pakistan decide to manufacture nuclear weapons
3 Both India and Pakistan succeed in acquiring or developing a bomb
design
4 Both India and Pakistan succeed in building a bomb
5 Both India and Pakistan either adapt existing weapon systems or develop
new ones capable of delivering nuclear warheads and acquire or 
develop adequate C^I structures
6 At any of the above stages India and/or Pakistan either do not launch
or launch an unsuccessful pre-emptive strike to prevent the other 
side from developing and building nuclear weapons
All the above assumptions are likely to be met with reasonable 
certainty except numbers 2 and 6, both of which essentially involve 
political decisions The two are of course crucial assumptions, but m  a 
worst-case scenario (from the point of view of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons) both of these would be met
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON USE
An atomic explosion releases energy in three forms blast, nuclear 
radiation, and thermal radiation (heat) Blast is a high-powered "wind” 
that is forced away from the point of explosion, and is caused by a sudden 
increase in pressure around the area of blast leading to overpressure The 
normal atmospheric pressure is 14 7 pounds per square inch (psi) A 5 psi 
overpressure means that in the given part of the atmosphere the atmospheric
4pressure is 19 7 psi, ¿hile the remainder of the atmosphere is still at 
14 7 psi At the point where the high pressure (19 7 psi) and low pressure 
(14 7 psi) meet, a tremendous force is built up as the high pressure 
attempts to stabilize itself by becoming equal to the normal pressure 
Though it lasts for only a short time after an explosion, overpressure is 
very destructive For example a 5 psi overpressure would exert a momentary 
force of 180 tons on the walls of a typical two-story house ^ It would 
also produce a "wind” of up to 160 mph which could cause ”fatal collisions 
between people and nearby objects "3 Most of the material damage caused by 
a typical nuclear explosion on the surface, or at low or moderate altitudes 
in the air, is caused directly or indirectly by the shock (or blast) wave 
which accompanies the explosion Many structures will suffer damage at 
even 1 psi overpressure 4 The magnitude of the blast effect depends on the 
yield of the weapon and the height of burst The higher the burst, the 
larger the area affected by overpressure
A second type of destructive energy released by a nuclear explosion is 
thermal radiation Actually all the energy released by a nuclear 
explosion, including residual radiation from weapon debris, is thermal 
energy (heat),5 but what we shall consider thermal radiation is that part 
which can cause fire damage and personal injury Approximately 35 percent 
of the energy of a typical nuclear explosion at up to a height of 100,000 
feet is in the form of thermal energy of this type  ^ The actual fraction 
of energy that appears as thermal radiation depends upon the height of 
burst, total yield, as well as other characteiistics of the weapon As a 
result of the high amount of energy released per unit mass, very high 
temperatures are attained, and are estimated to be several tens of million
5degrees The flash from a 1 megaton bomb will cause flashblmdness up to 
13 miles away on a clear day and 53 miles away on a clear night
Thermal radiation causes damage in two ways First, it causes 
dangerous burns on human flesh Second, it may cause, depending upon the 
amount of combustible material in the area of the explosion, massive fires 
A single megaton weapon can cause third degree burns up to five miles away 
which, if left untreated, can be fatal A similar weapon also causes 
second degree burns up to distances of six miles, which lead to 
infection-causing blisters The same explosion can cause first degree 
burns similar to sunburn up to seven miles away 7 The distances up to 
which burns are caused depend upon weather conditions, the behavior pattern 
of thermal energy is similar to that of sunlight
Thermal radiation also results in massive fires, the energy released 
causes combustion According to some estimates up to 10 percent of the 
buildings within the 5 psi ring may catch fire, while within the 2 psi ring 
about 2 percent of the buildings may sustain fire damage ® These fires may 
coalesce and cause massive conflagrations The vertical updraft of heated 
air may cause a firestorm which can be made worse by existing winds 9 
Temperatures can exceed 1000°C
A nuclear explosion also releases radiation Nuclear radiation is 
released in two forms direct nuclear radiation and fallout Direct 
nuclear radiation is a stream of atomic particles which may be injurious or 
fatal to a human being depending upon the extent of exposure Fallout is 
nuclear radiation caused by contaminated debris lifted by the explosion and 
carried by the wind to other areas Exposure to nuclear radiation is 
measured in REM (Roentgen equivalent man) A dose of 600 REM within a
6short period of time (six to seven days) could result in fatal illness 
among 90 percent of the population exposed A dose of 450 REM within a 
short period of time could cause up to 50 percent fatalities, the other 50 
percent becoming very sick, but eventually recovering A dose of 300 REM 
would kill about 10 percent of those exposed A dose of 50 REM will not 
cause any short term effects but between 0 4 and 2 5 percent of those 
exposed to this dosage would eventually contract a fatal cancer ^
PREDICTION OF EFFECTS
Figure 1 below shows the damage that a nuclear explosion would cause 
burn effects, 2 psi, and 5 psi overpressure rings The smaller rings 
represent the effects of a 20 kiloton burst and the larger rings those of a 
one megaton burst 11 These are the two sizes which this study will 
utilize These have been chosen for several reasons First, a 15-20 
kiloton bomb is definitely within India s manufacturing capability 
Secondly, if a fission-fusion-fission device (hydrogen bomb) is developed 
by either or both countries the likely size will be 1 megaton, since 
weapons with larger yields would not be very useful This is because large 
nuclear weapons are likely to be used against civilian targets as part of a 
counter-value strategy, and given the size of most urban centers in South 
Asia a one megaton weapon would be of sufficient strength to do the job
7FIGURE ONE DAMAGE RADII OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(AIR BURST, OPTIMUM HEIGHT)
2nd Degree Burns 
11 miles
5 psi 
1 2 miles
8Since this study only discusses the use of 15-20 Kt or 1 MT weapons 
(and since some of the data on effects is available only for one of these 
sizes or a different size altogether) a scaling formula is used to convert 
the area of a psi ring from an explosion of one size to the area of a psi 
ring of the same strength from an explosion of another size This formula 
is given below
D w1/3
D W
Where W is the KT yield from an explosion of known size
D is the distance from the point of explosion of W yield where 
a given overpressure occurs
W is the KT yield from another explosion
D is the distance from the point of explosion of W yield where 
the same level of overpressure as in a W yield explosion 
will occur 12
Therefore, if we have to convert the distance of the 5 psi ring of a 20 
KT explosion to that of the distance of a 5 psi ring from a 15 KT explosion 
and we know that the 5 psi ring from a 20 KT explosion peaks at a distance 
of 1 1 miles, we could do so by using the formula as follows
D 151/3
1 1 20
151/3 X 1 1
D = - —
20
D 999 miles or 1 mile (approximately)
9The psi ring is useful because it is used by some studies to calculate 
death and injuries by assuming that all people inside the 5 psi ring will 
die and nobody outside it will 13 This same method is used in this study 
to predict deaths and injuries The area (square miles) within the 5 psi 
ring is designated the lethal area, i e , the area within which all persons 
are killed
The lethal area is computed by using the following formula 
A = * r 2
Where A is the area within the 5 psi ring 
*  is = 3 14
r = radius of the 5 psi ring
If r = 1, we can calculate the area within the 5 psi ring (lethal area) for 
a 15 KT weapon as being 3 1 square miles If r = 4 4 ( for a 1 MT weapon), 
we can calculate the lethal area for a 1-Megaton weapon as being 60 7 
square miles
Computation of deaths caused by a weapon (Td) is determined by 
multiplying the given population density (Pd) by the lethal area (A)
Td = Pd X A
A study of projected casualty tables in such works as The Effects of 
Nuclear War11* and actual casualty figures m  Japan as given in 
International Arms Control^  and Effects of Nuclear Weapons^  shows that m  
nuclear explosions injuries generally do not exceed deaths, and when they 
do so it is only by a small fraction In this study, just as we have used
the 5 psi ring as the limit of the lethal area, we have also used the 2 2
psi ring as the outer limit of the injury zone, all persons outide the 5
psi ring but within the 2 2 psi ring are injured and none outside the area
10
of the 2 2 psi ring are injured This formulation is based on the
following reasoning a study of the casualty figures, real and projected,
in the above named sources shows that the number of deaths declines sharply 
beyond the 3 25 psi ring and becomes relatively negligible beyond the 1 2 
psi ring, whereas the number of injured survivors is the highest within the 
area between these two rings Taking the median point between the 3 25 and 
1 2 psi rings we have therefore estimated that all people between the 5 psi 
ring and the 2 2 psi ring will be injured and none beyond the 2 2 psi ring 
will suffer injuries Like the use of the 5 psi ring to determine the
lethal area, the use of the 2 2 psi ring to determine the zone of injury
will make the task of calculating casualties easier without making too big 
of a sacrifice in accuracy
Property damage is defined in terms of square miles of built up area 
destroyed The 2 psi ring is used to determine property damage 17 Using 
the calculation system in Glasstone and Dolan,18 the area likely to be 
destroyed has been calculated as follows
TABLE ONE PROPERTY DAMAGE
WEAPON
YIELD
TYPE OF 
BURST
RADIUS OF 
2 psi
RING(miles)
PROPERTY 
DESTROYED 
(sq Miles)
15 KT Air 2 12 5
15 KT Surface 1 25 4 9
1 MT Air 8 200 9
1 MT Surface 5 78 5
Variations in terrain and the possibility of a firestorm could affect 
the above property damage figures by up to a factor of fivt 20 As we shall
11
discuss, certain features peculiar to South Asia would sharply increase the 
size of fatalities, injuries and property damage than implied by the above 
method of calculation We believe that casualty and damage figures 
projected by the above means will be on the optimistic side, actual figures 
are likely to be higher Finally it should be remembered that the figures 
generated by the above method are only approximations
FACTORS PECULIAR TO SOUTH ASIA LIKELY TO AFFECT CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE
There are some additional factors which are likely to affect the 
extent of damage and casualties in South Asia in case of a nuclear war 
First, the high population density would force casualty figures to levels 
much higher than those likely to be experienced in Europe, North America or 
the U S S R  However, these casualty figures will represent a smaller 
percent of the population of South Asia than the percentage of the 
population likely to be destroyed in Europe, North America or the U S S R  
This is because of the higher level of urbanization in the latter regions
Second, the damage caused by thermal effects of nuclear explosions is 
likely to be more severe than in Europe, North America or the U S S R  
because of the very limited fire-fighting capabilities m  the two South 
Asian countries
Third, burn injuries would be a severe medical problem The tendency 
of burn victims to die if not promptly treated and the relatively sparse 
medical resources available could lead to very high mortality rates among 
the initial survivors of the attack There are only 26 physicians and 75
12
hospital beds per 100,000 persons available in India and only 25 physicians 
and 50 hospital beds per 100,000 persons available in Pakistan 21
Fourth, while m  more economically developed countries post-attack 
casualties could be limited by relying on the medical, shelter and economic 
resources of the small and medium sized cities, this may not be true for 
nations which are not so economically advanced Outside of the few large 
cities, neither India nor Pakistan, especially the latter, have the 
necessary resources In fact, it is very doubtful that post-attack 
recovery is possible for either country without massive outside assistance 
With regard to this one more point should be borne in mind comparisons of 
nuclear wars involving counter-value attacks (counter-city strikes) with 
natural disasters is very misleading Nuclear attacks would focus on the 
destruction of industrial, technological and administrative structures 
Those very institutions and assets which allow recovery from the effects of 
a disaster would themselves be totally destroyed
Fifth, in economically less developed countries, a very high 
percentage of national value (administrative, technical and industrial 
infrastructure) can be destroyed with relatively few warheads, since these 
are concentrated in small areas Beyond this, further destruction would 
require a large number of warheads The figure below illustrates the 
point This would mean that only a few populated centers have to be hit to 
destroy national value The positive aspect of this, if there is any 
positive aspect at all, is that this will keep civilian casualties confined 
to a few areas This point should be kept in mind when discussing effects 
of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, and is especially 
applicable to the latter
13
FIGURE TWO CONCAVE VULNERABILITY FUNCTION 
IN ECONOMICALLY LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES22
SOPHISTICATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGY
Certain basic characteristics of any future Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
balance should be noted before we embark on scenario-building
India’s greater resources and higher level of technological 
development would probably result in its having more nuclear weapons than 
Pakistan in case the region is nucleanzed In the absence of a weapons 
manufacturing program m  either country it is not possible to project 
accurate figures as to the number of warheads likely to be m  the 
possession of the two countries by the 1990’s, however, some rough 
calculations have been made Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution 
has estimated that Pakistan could build up a modest nuclear force of
14
between fifty and one hundred 50 KT weapons 23 it is estimated that India 
is likely to be able to build up and maintain a substantial lead in the 
number of warheads that each country possesses A recent study on small 
nuclear forces estimates that in 1982 India had the potential to produce 
enough fissile material to produce a maximum of 53 warheads per year This 
capacity would increase to 119 warheads a year by 1990 and 177 warheads a 
year by 2000 A maximum of 995 warheads may be accrued by 1990 and 2,732 
warheads by 2000 Similarly Pakistani potential production capacity would 
be 21 warheads a year in 1990,increasing to 77 warheads a year by 2000 
The accrued total of warheads could stand at 300 warheads by 1990 and 1,070 
warheads by 2000 It must be noted that these figures are upper boundary 
estimates that assume efficient production and use of fissile material 
The yield of these warheads would be the smallest possible needed to 
achieve an explosive chain reaction Therefore these figures should be 
used to arrive at a general idea rather than as precise measures of the 
equivalent megatonnage (EMT) or throw weight capacity the two nations are 
capable of achieving
The second chief feature of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear balance would be 
the relative vulnerability of the two countries Pakistan's smaller size 
and greater accessability to Indian attack aircraft makes it more 
vulnerable than India m  case of a nuclear exchange, since all of India is 
not within the range o i Pakistani aircraft Unless Pakistan acquires other 
delivery systems it will not have the capability to threaten all of India 
in the near future
This brings us to the question of delivery systems that the two 
countries have or are likely to acquire in the near future At this time
15
both countries have modern aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons 
India has the MiG 23t Jaguar, and the Mirage 2000, while Pakistan has the 
Mirage III and V and the F-16 Figures 3 and 4 below show the areas in the 
two countries that are within range of these aircraft As the two figures 
show, whereas all of Pakistan is within range of Indian aircraft, only the 
northwestern and western regions of India are within range of Pakistani 
aircraft Other delivery systems can also be utilized According to one 
study, it is well within India's capability to develop IRBM's by the end of 
this decade 25 This study, based on India's recent advances in the area of 
space technology, states that India has developed the capability to put 
reconnaissance satellites into orbit,26 and the INSAT satellites, now being 
put into orbit, will substantially upgrade India's command and control 
capabilities 27 The study also points out that the SLV-3 boosters used by 
India to launch satellites can be converted into IRBM's with a range of 
about 930 miles (1500 KM's) 28 India is currently designing a powerful 
liquid-fuel rocket which could also serve as a delivery vehicle for nuclear 
warheads 29 s K Ghosh, a senior official with the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (ISRO) has observed that India could develop an IRBM prototype 
within two years 30 if incjla were to develop IRBMs with a range of about 
930 miles, it could maintain a nuclear strike force out of the range of 
Pakistani aircraft, yet capable of hitting almost all of Pakistan Thus if 
and when the two countries acquire nuclear weapons they will also have 
delivery systems, there need not be a time lag between the acquisition of
the two
16
All these factors would have an impact on strategy and should be kept 
m  mind when discussing the uses of nuclear weapons by the two countries 
and likely scenarios in an Indo-Pakistani nuclear exchange
SCENARIOS
One can think up scores of different scenarios likely to occur in a 
nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan In the section below we shall 
discuss six of the mos« likely ones All these scenarios assume that a 
political decision to use nuclear weapons has already been taken The 
dynamics and likelihood of such a decision being taken are discussed 
later
SCENARIO A Attacks on military targets and formations
SCENARIO B Attacks on military targets and limited strikes on economic
targets
SCENARIO C General attack on military and economic targets
SCENARIO D Counter-city strikes
SCENARIO E Symbolic/warning strike
SCENARIO F »Blackmail*
We shall take up each of these scenarios, briefly identify the goals 
and targets in each, and calculate estimated damage likely to result from 
each This will be followed by an evaluation of the use of nuclear weapons 
for deterrence, compellence and for tactical purposes in the Indo-Pakistani 
context The probability of a nuclear exchange actually taking place
between the two countries will also be assessed
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SCENARIO A
This scenario envisages an attack by India and/or Pakistan on each 
other’s military targets and formations Such an attack would hit major 
cantonments within striking range, and would be a part of a strategy of 
compellence or to fulfill tactical military purposes The goal would be 
the destruction of the enemy’s major military formations in order to 
prevent a conventional attack, or as a prelude to military action by the 
attacking side
Since the aim would be to destroy concentrated military personnel and 
equipment, 20 KT weapons are likely to be used These would fulfill the 
purpose of the attack and limit collateral damage to a minimum For the 
same reason surface bursts are likely to be used This would result in 5 
psi rings of a radius of 8 miles, 2 2 psi rings of a radius of 1 3 miles 
and 2 psi rings with a radius of 1 M miles31 (see endnote for 
explanation)
The tables below identify targets, and summarize casualties likely to 
be caused by such an exchange
TABLE W O
CASUALTY AND DAMAGE PROJECTIONS 
LIMITED ATTACK ON MILITARY CENTERS OF PAKISTAN
TARGET
CANTONMENTS
POPULATION 
OF CITY 
(1990)32
ESTIMATED 
DEATHS33
ESTIMATED
INJURIES34
PROPERTY 
DESTROYED 
(Sq Mis )35
Karachi 8,337,100 128,900 211,541 6 16
Lahore 4,599,900 66,100 10,800 6 16
Rawalpindi 1,427,100 68,300 11,200 4 12
Hyderabad 1,088,000 44,600 73,200 4 12
Peshawar 383,100 27,500 45,100 3 08
Si al ko t 283,200 20,400 33,400 6 16
Quetta 282,600 35,500 58,300 6 16
Bhawalpur 261,900 18,800 30,900 6 16
Wah Cantt 222,100 148,00036 74,00036 6 16
Gujrat 212,500 15,300 25,100 6 16
Montgomery 51,600 3,700 6,100 6 16
TOTALS 17,149,100 577,100 579,641 61 60
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TABLE THREE
CASUALTY AND DAMAGE PROJECTIONS 
LIMITED ATTACK ON MILITARY CENTERS OF INDIA
TARGET
CANTONMENTS
POPULATION 
OF CITY 
(1990)37
ESTIMATED
DEATHS38
ESTIMATED
INJURIES39
PROPERTY 
DESTROYED 
(Sq Mis )35
Bombay 11,91^,900 136,900 224,600 6 16
Delhi 9,118,600 40,700 66,900 4 62
Ahmedabad 3,164,100 153,500 251,900 3 08
Agra 1,041,800 91,100 149,400 6 16
Gowaliar 944,300 18,000 25,400 6 16
Baroda 821,400 4,200 6,900 6 16
Amritsar 813,500 15,500 21,900 6 16
Ludhiana 775,800 14,800 20,900 6 16
Jullandhar 590,900 11,300 15,900 6 16
Rajkot 529,100 10,100 14,200 6 16
Meerut 528,400 10,100 14,200 6 16
Jamnagar 408,400 79,300 13,000 6 16
Jhansi 337,300 6,400 9,100 6 16
Aimer 334,300 6,400 9,000 6 16
Jammu 273,400 5,200 7,400 6 16
TOTALS 31,596,200 603,500 850,700 84 70
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These figures are of initial casualties, they do not include 
casualties which would occur from delayed effects of such an attack 
The targets listed above are mainly army cantonments A nuclear 
attack by either country would also seek to destroy both nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems This would involve attacks on air fields and on 
missile sites These attacks might also consist of 15-20 KT weapons set 
for surface burst The number of airfields targeted would depend upon the 
deployment policy adopted by Pakistan Two broad^ options are available 
Given the accessability of almost all of Pakistan to Indian aircraft, 
Pakistan might choose to concentrate its nuclear weapons and aircraft 
committed to a nuclear attack mission on a few air bases while 
concentrating its defenses on protecting these bases from a surprise 
attack On the other land they might adopt a strategy of dispersal, making 
it more difficult for India to carry out a decapitating air strike because 
of the problems of coordinating and successfully carrying out several air 
strikes simultaneously Whatever deployment policy is adopted, the 
location of nuclear weapon air bases is likely to optimize distance from 
the frontier (the farther away the better, giving more warning time in case 
of an attack) with penetrability of Pakistani own air strikes (the shorter 
the distance from the frontier, the better) Given the above the airfields 
likely to be used as bases for nuclear weapons and attack aircraft include 
Badin, Bhawalpur, Peshawar,and Lyallpur These would be targets of an
Indian attack
21
The greater range of Indian nuclear capable aircraft along with the 
fact that all of India cannot be reached by Pakistani aircraft (at least 
the new modern sophisticated aircraft, Canberra bombers which have greater 
range are slow and vulnerable) makes the Indian task of deployment less 
complicated Likely air bases include Delhi, Mathura, Gwalior, Udaipur,
and Jamnagar Air bases located close to the frontier would not be used
because they would be nore vulnerable without any payoff in terms of 
increased penetrability of aircraft based there (See Figure 3)
If India were to acquire or develop IRBMfs (see above) it could deploy 
them as far east as Allahabad and still cover the core areas of Pakistan
These missile sites could only be reached by Pakistani aircraft if they
were to carry out one way attack missions
Both countries might locate their nuclear attack forces at new air 
bases Such bases may be built away from population centers to reduce 
casualties in case they are attacked On the other hand, they might be 
built close to civilian centers and thus signal to the opposing side that 
an attack on these bases would cause so many civilian casualties that any 
illusion of limiting the war and preventing scenarios B, C, and D from 
occunng would be destroyed
The discussion here has concerned itself with attacks on military 
targets in cantonments and on some air bases It has not discussed attacks 
on units deployed on the frontier Use of nuclear weapons against the 
latter would constitute tactical use The probability of such use is 
discussed later on Because of the mobility of these targets and changing 
deployment postures, it is difficult to project targets and casualties if
22
field formations are aotacked with nuclear weapons No such attempt is 
made here
It is clear from the above discussion that even an attack limiting 
itself to military targets in cantonments and airfields using relatively 
small weapons (20 KT), and trying to minimize collateral damage (surface 
bursts), would cause substantial death, injury and destruction of property 
Some of the reasons for high casualty figures have already been discussed 
above An additional factor is the fact that the major cantonments which 
would be targeted are located within or adjacent to cities
SCENARIO B
This scenario envisages attacks by India and/or Pakistan on not only 
military targets but also on major economic targets Such an attack would 
again aim at fulfilling compellence goals The attacks on economic targets 
would be more harmful uo Pakistan for several reasons First, whereas 
India can attack almost any economic target within Pakistan, large parts of 
India’s industrial heartland— central Uttar Pradesh, most of Maharashtra, 
West Bengal— will be out of range of Pakistani aircraft (unless one way 
suicide missions are undertaken) Second, attacks on economic targets 
would mean a decision to fight a prolonged war This would enable India to 
mobilize its superior resources and wear down Pakistan’s ability to 
resist
The military targets in this scenario would be the same as in scenario 
A The tables below list likely economic targets in an exchange which 
targets major economic centers
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TABLE FOUR
MAJOR ECONOMIC TARGETS IN PAKISTAN40
A ENERGY
1) Hydro-electric Power Stations
a) Mangia
b) Warsak
2) Thermal Power Stations
a) Multan
b) Sukkur
3) Nuclear Power Station
a) Karachi
4) Gas
a) oui gas fields
5) Oil Refineries
a) Multan
b) Attock
B IRRIGATION AND WATER RESOURCES
1) Mangia Dam
2) Tarbela Dam
3) Sidhnai Barrage
4) Sulemanki Barrage
5) Panjnad Barrage
6) Sukkur Barrage
7) Kot n  Barrage
C INDUSTRIES
1 ) Iron and Steel
a) Karachi
2) Ordinance
a) Wah
b) Kamara
c) Taxila
3) Chemicals and Fertilizers
a) Karachi
b) Lyallpur
c) Shiekhupura
d) Lahore
4) Cement
a) Dera Ghazi Khan
b) Thatta
D TRANSPORT
1) Jhang Railway Junction
2) Hyderabad Railway Junction
3) Miawali Railway Junction
4) Karachi Railway Junction
5) Karachi Port
TABLE FIVE
MAJOR ECONOMIC TARGETS IN INDIA41
A ENERGY
1) Hydro-electric Power Stations
a) Trombay
b) Bhakra
c) Kotla
2) Thermal Power Stations
a) Bhavnagar
b) Agra
c) Ahmedabad
3) Nuclear Power Stations
a) Narora
b) Tarapur
4) Petroleum
a) Bombay
b) Baroda
c) Mathura
B IRRIGATION AND WATER RESOURCES
1) Nanaksagar Dam
2) Sardasagar Dam
3) Nang al Dam
4) Gangapur Dam
5) Pong Dam
6) Suil-Bana Dam
C INDUSTRIES
1) Bombay
2) Far id ab ad
3) Bhatinda
4) Ghaziabad
5) Mathura
6) Agra
7) Amritsar
8) Ludhiana
9) Ambala
10) Baroda
11) Jamnagar
TRANSPORTATION
1) Railways
a) Agra Junction
b) Delhi Junction
c) Amritsar
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d) Amballa Cantt
e) Bombay Central
f) Bombay V T
g) Baroda 
2) Ports
a) Bombay
b) Kandia
c) Jamnagar
Successful attacks on the targets listed in Table Four above would 
result in severe damage to Pakistan's economic infrastructure For 
example, the destruction of the four hydro-electric and thermal power 
stations listed above would reduce Pakistani thermal and hydro-electric 
power production from 1,583 to 715 million watts The destruction of the 
Mangia and Tarbela dams would reduce water storage capacity by 16 6 million 
acre-feet The destruction of barrages listed in Table Four would lead to 
the total disruption in control over irrigation in the Indus valley system 
The destruction of the railway centers listed would paralyze rail transport 
m  Pakistan Destruction of Karachi's port would lead to total disruption 
of sea communications Though all economic targets in India will not be 
within range of Pakistani weapon systems, the damage there would still be 
grave Besides deaths and injuries which would result immediately, the 
long term impact of attacks on economic targets could mean widespread 
famine, rampant epidemics, and the destruction of the two countries as 
viable economic systems
The weapons used to achieve these results could have small yields 
The civilian casualty figures in both countries would, of course, be much 
higher than if attacks were limited to military targets only These have 
not been calculated here because of the unavailability of data on size and 
density of population in some of the areas listed in the tables above
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SCENARIO C
A more widespread attack on military and economic targets could occur 
If this were to happen it would be a case of overkill, because damage done 
by destroying targets listed m  Tables Four and Five would be enough to 
cause total economic disruption in both countries The scenario now being 
discussed could evolve, however, as a result of steady escalation during a 
war wherein retaliatory strikes would gradually lead to attacks on 
relatively minor economic or military targets Such a development is 
unlikely, if only because of the limited number of nuclear warheads which 
will be available to the two countries in the near future Given the 
concave vulnerability function discussed on page 13, the limited number of 
warheads available would make a scenario like this impossible In case of 
a really savage war, scenario D is more likely to occur
SCENARIO D
A more deadly use of nuclear weapons would involve strikes primarily 
aimed at the other's civilian population centers in pursuance of a policy 
of deterrence
Unlike the other scenarios, this one would involve the destruction of 
urban centers and the infliction of the maximum possible civilian 
casualties Therefore, weapons with higher yields and air, rather than 
surface, bursts are likely to be used Either a 1 MT weapon or several 
weapons with smaller yield could be used against each target The 5 psi 
ring from a 1 MT air burst would have a radius of 4 4 miles, the 2 2 psi 
ring radius of 7 6 miles, and the 2 psi ring a radius of 8 1 miles 31 
Given the congested nature and small area of most South Asian cities very
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high casualties will result For example, the entire area of the city of 
Lahore would fall within the 1 Lethal Zone' The tables below list likely 
targets in a counter-city strike scenario
TABLE SIX
TARGETS IN A COUNTER-CITY STRIKE AGAINST PAKISTAN
CITY POPULATION(1990)32 ESTIMATED DEATHS42
Karachi 8,337,100 6,252,000
Lahore 4,599,900 4,500,000
Lyallpur 2,064,300 2,000,000
Rawalpindi 1,427,100 1,400,000
Hyderabad 1,088,000 1,088,000
Multan 1,007,200 1,000,000
Gujranwala 885,300 885,000
Peshawar 383,100 383,000
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TABLE SEVEN
TARGETS IN A COUNTER-CITY STRIKE AGAINST INDIA
CITY POPULATION(1990)37 ESTIMATED DEATHS43
Bombay 11,91^,900 8,936,000
Delhi 9,118,600 9,100,000
Ahmedabad 3,164,100 3,100,000
Agra 1,041,800 1,020,000
Gowaliar 944,300 940,000
Jaipur 904,600 900,000/
Baroda 821,400 800,000
Amritsar 813,500 810,000
Indore 798,900 790,000
Ludhiana 775,800 770,000
Surat 693,500 690,000
Jullandhar 590,900 500,000
Meerut 528,400 500,000
Jodhpur 467,000 390,000
Ghaziabad 174,700 168,000
As has already been pointed out, casualties are likely to be very high 
because of the congested nature of South Asian cities, the limited firefighting 
capabilities in most cities, limited medical facilities, and the total 
disruption of the administrative infrastructure on a national scale Unlike the
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more developed countries, India and Pakistan would not be able to rely on the 
medical, administrative and economic resources of the small and medium sized 
towns not hit in a nuclear war One of the results would be more deaths caused 
by non-treatment of the injured and by uncontrolled epidemics
Assuming that a 15 mph wind is blowing over each city, fallout, 3,000 REM 
ÜÜstrong,would cover a downwind area of 140 sq miles Thus eight such 
patterns covering an area of 1,120 sq miles would hover over Pakistan Similar
fallout patterns would cover an area of 2,100 sq miles in India ^  This would 
cause additional deaths from exposure to radiation These deaths are not 
included m  the estimates in Tables Six and Seven above Given the high 
population density of some of the areas surrounding the major cities targeted in 
this scenario, the number of such deaths would be very high
SCENARIO E
Another possible scenario would involve a warning or symbolic attack by one 
country against the other Such an attack could be used to deter, compel or 
punish the other side
India or Pakistan may detonate a single, relatively low yield weapon on the 
other's territory as a warning to the other side of its serious intentions in 
case of an attack on itself, viz , as deterrence Such an attack could be 
carried out over a relatively sparsely populated part of the enemy1s territory 
so as to minimize the chances of escalation Targets could include Western 
Rajasthan in India and the Baluchistan desert in Pakistan
If the purpose of such an attack is compellence rather than deterrence, the 
target chosen could be of significant economic or psychological value to the 
other side Possible targets in Pakistan would be a port like Pasni, the oil
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refineries at Attock, the electric power station at Warsak, or the Sukkur or 
Kotn Barrage Possible targets in India could include ports like Dwarka or 
Jamnagar, the hydro-electric complex at Kota, oil refineries at Mathura, or the 
Nangal dam These targets would be chosen with the aim of signalling the 
serious intention of the attacker without causing so much damage as to make it 
impossible for the other side not to retaliate
A third use of a luclear device in a limited role could be to punish the 
enemy or "avenge national honor" by attacking a single target of some economic 
or symbolic value to the other side
The major problem with this kind of use is that once the nuclear threshold 
is crossed it is very unlikely that restraint could be exercised by either side, 
even if the political leadership wished to do so Moreover, the slightest 
miscalculation as to the real intention of the user could plunge the two 
countries into a full-scale nuclear confrontation
SCENARIO F
Yet another potential and dreaded use of nuclear weapons is for 
’blackmail* The government or an extremist group in either country could use 
nuclear weapons to blackmail the other side One such scenario could involve a 
plane carrying nuclear weapons circling a major city of the other side and 
demands being made on ohe rival government
It is very unlikely that a government would engage in such an enterprise, 
at least overtly If it did so it would either have to maintain the blackmail 
threat indefinitely or face inevitable retaliation if and when it ends the 
threat Use of nuclear weapons for compellence is, therefore, more likely to 
take the forms described in Scenarios A, B, C, or D A small group of
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extremists could get away with blackmail However, the demands they can make 
are limited in nature and scope These demands would have to be for money or 
some other movable, concealable and/or tangible thing which they could prevent 
the other side from recovering once the blackmail threat is removed The use of 
nuclear weapons by a group of criminals is likely to take such a form This is 
a danger which is not special to South Asia At the same time it is imperative 
that new nuclear powers take steps to ensure the security of their nuclear 
weapons and develop procedures to prevent a gang of criminals or dissidents from 
stealing a nuclear device
USABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA 
- CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVES
The crucial issue remains what are the chances that nuclear weapons would 
actually be used by India and Pakistan against each other? Any examination of 
the constraints and incentives involved leads us to the conclusion that such use 
is very unlikely This is because of a series of pragmatic reasons —  some 
domestic, some regional, some international, and some geographic We do assume 
that rationality and perspective are retained by regional decísion-makers during 
a period of crisis In the section which follows we shall discuss these factors 
m  some detail 
Use As Deterrence
A study of the Pakistani military strategic debate over development of a 
nuclear doctrine seems to follow the predictable lines of nuclear strategy 
evolved elsewhere, i e , to adopt the general principles of deterrence, the main 
adversary being India Advocates of nuclear weapons in India also justify their 
demands for the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of their deterrence 
value against both China and Pakistan
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For Pakistani its strategic and military security threats are permanent and 
lethal Most of these arise out of that country1s security dilemma vis-a-vis 
India, and more recently, the Russian occupation of Afghanistan These external 
threats are compounded by internal instability and inadequacy of 
security-related resources 46 Given the overall superiority of the powers which 
exert external pressure on Pakistan through their conventional strength alone, 
the possession and use of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence is very 
attractive As the imbalance in conventional military strength between India 
and Pakistan increases in India's favor, the idea of such use of nuclear weapons 
could become more acceptable even to the few Pakistanis who now oppose them 
Indeed, it is possible to stand the Proliferation Chain argument on its head m  
the case of the Indo-Pakistan dyad The argument has been that China's 
acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to India's acquiring one and this in 
turn would lead to a Pakistani bomb We can instead argue that Pakistan needs 
nuclear weapons to offset India's conventional military superiority In order 
to prevent Pakistan from using these nuclear weapons for compellence (for 
example, in Kashmir) rather than deterrence, India needs nuclear weapons As K 
Subrahmanyam puts it, though in a different context, "nuclear weapons can be 
deterred only by nuclear weapons The proliferation of nuclear weapons into
South Asia may indeed follow this pattern
If the two nations develop striking power to the extent that their 
respective nuclear forces serve only to cancel each other out— to deter use of 
nuclear weaons— diplomatic, political, and perhaps even conventional military 
interactions may proceed in much the same manner as before There would be, 
however, one important difference Direct external threats from India to the 
very existence of Pakistan as a state could no longer exist On one hand, this
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could lead to fewer restraints on adventurist tendencies among Pakistani 
leaders, on the other hand, it would remove what is felt by many to be the root 
cause of the continuing conflict between the two countries— the widespread 
feeling among the Pakistanis that India is bent on dismembering and perhaps 
absorbing their country The possession of nuclear weapons would enable the 
Pakistanis to inflict unacceptable punishment on India should the latter 
threaten the very existence of Pakistan In my opinion, the positive effects 
of an increased sense of security among the Pakistani elite would far outweigh 
any negative impact caused by increased adventurism m  its leadership Though 
both nations have committed acts of brinkmanship in the past, policy formation 
and crisis behavior have on the whole been pragmatic and sober Indeed, the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides may prevent even conventional wars 
between the two countries as leaders exercise extra caution for fear of starting 
a nuclear war
The successful maintainance of a credible deterrence posture by the two 
countries against each other would, however, not be a simple matter First of 
all it would require superior Pakistani technical ability to offset India s 
larger nuclear arsenal (which is inevitable given India’s greater resources and 
the threat it faces from a nuclear China), and the fact that, whereas all of 
Pakistan is within strike range of Indian planes and missiles, all of India 
including missile launching areas are not within range of Pakistan (see Figures 
3 and 4) Thus superior technology would be needed to prevent India from 
carrying out a decapitating first strike against Pakistani nuclear weapons 
Given the current imbalance of technical ability in India's favor, it is hard to 
envisage Pakistan acquiring the needed technical ability In the absence of 
such security for a Pakistani force, acquisition of nuclear weapons would be
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more destabilizing than stabilizing, because the temptation to use the weapons 
before they are destroyed would be great
Another problem, related to the first, which could lead to similar 
premature use is that of the inability to deliver a nuclear weapon under certain 
battle conditions It has been pointed out that if Pakistan were in such dire 
military straits that it actually decided to use nuclear weapons against an 
attacking enemy it might have already lost the military ability to deliver the 
warheads **8 This could mean that the decision as to when exactly to use nuclear 
weapons would be left to the military, as it alone would best be able to 
determine when the armed forces were about to lose the capability to deliver the 
warheads This would indeed be a very destabilizing factor!
A third problem with nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pakistani dyad is that 
of command and control Unless both countries developed strong c3i, Pakistan, 
and to a more limited extent, India, would face a tradeoff between viability and 
stability The former might encourage the adoption of LoW (Launch on Warning) 
postures Needless to say, LoW is not conducive to confidence in robust mutual 
deterrence
These three are the major problems which would destabilize nuclear 
deterrence If the two countries were to acquire nuclear weapons it would be 
imperative that various steps be taken to overcome the above problems so that 
credible deterrence may be established We have already pointed out the 
conditions necessary for the establishment of credible deterrence by Pakistan 
and the problems which it is likely to encounter in establishing them It must 
be asserted here that unless these problems are overcome the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into the region would be extremely destabilizing If Pakistan 
were to acquire nuclear weapons but not the necessary technology to make them
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invulnerable to a decapitating first strike by India the incentive to launch a 
pre-emptive strike during a crisis or adopt a Launch on Warning strategy would 
be great Such vulnerability of Pakistani weapons could also provide India with 
incentives to use nuclear weapons First, the option of neutralizing Pakistani 
nuclear weapons with little or no loss would be available to Indian decision 
makers Second, the fact that the Pakistanis, being aware of the vulnerability 
of their weapons, might launch a pre-emptive strike would in turn serve as an 
incentive to India to pre-empt them
Protection is not enough The Pakistanis must develop a capability to 
deliver such weapons during a crisis situation, even after its armed forces have 
been severely mauled in a conflict with India Lack of an ability to do so 
would have the same impact on deterrence strategy and decision making calculus 
of both India and Pakistan as vulnerability of actual warheads
Adequate c3i would also be needed Here again it is Pakistan which would 
face greater problems because of the level of technological achievement 
Adequate C^I would be needed not only to deter adoption of such strategies as 
Launch on Warning, but would also have to be geared to ensure that unauthorized 
use cannot occur Both sides would have to know enough about each otherfs C^I 
to promote confidence against pre-emptive and "unauthorized use” scenarios from 
occuring It would therefore be necessary to establish communication links
between the two, specifically geared to such communication and coordination of 
information It should be noted that besides solving the problems discussed 
above, other measures would also be needed to establish a credible deterrence 
posture These would include successful communication to the other side of an 
ability and will to use nuclear weapons if the security of the state is 
threatened beyond a certain point The elaboration of a clear deterrence
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doctrine which would inform the other side about conditions under which a 
non-nuclear conflict situation would escalate into nuclear conflict would also 
be necessary
Use As Compelíenee
Compellence would only work if one side were to have a monopoly of nuclear 
weapons or a superiority which would make it impossible for the 1 compelee* to 
retaliate against the 'compellor1 At the very least, the demands made by the 
'compellor1 should not be viewed as being so outrageous or so destructive to the 
nationhood of the 'compellee1 as to make them unacceptable even under threat of 
nuclear attack If the ’compellee1 had a nuclear force of its own, chances of 
successful compellence would be very low indeed One of our assumptions, was 
that both sides had acquired nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them 
Under such conditions, use of nuclear weapons for compellence would be 
impractical
Let us take the example of Kashmir It is hard to imagine either India or 
Pakistan giving up the areas of Kashmir under their control to the other side 
because of nuclear threats, especially if both had nuclear weapons Both 
countries consider control over their part of Kashmir vital to their national 
character, albeit for different reasons Neither would give up control in face 
of nuclear threats from the other side which could be countered by nuclear 
weapons in its own possession
The successful use of nuclear weapons for compellence by one side would 
lead to a rapid escalation of such use, a situation equally unacceptable to both 
sides because of the destabilizing affect it would have, and the dangers of a 
slide into nuclear exchange Thus constraints on use of nuclear weapons for
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compellenee are strong, and it is doubtful if attempts at such use would 
succeed
The use of nuclear weapons for compellence by a small group of fanatics on 
either side— »blackmail»— has already been discussed in Scenario F Here it is 
sufficient to recall the impracticability and unlikelihood of such a method 
being used by a state to achieve national goals
Use As Tactical Weapons
Nuclear weapons may also be used to attack field formations during battle 
It is our contention that differentiating between tactical and strategic use of 
nuclear weapons in the South Asian context is fallacious, if for no other reason 
than the number of civilian casualties that would occur on both sides The 
situation here is different from the one m  Europe, where use of »tactical* 
nuclear weapons would not kill Russian and American civilians (European 
civilians would of course die, and it is for this reason that the Europeans 
don»t see much of a difference between strategic and tactical weapons) The 
damage and loss of life which would occur in South Asia not only makes such a 
distinction a cruel joke but also dangerous Escalation of »tactical* use into 
Scenario D (counter-city strikes) is almost inevitable, given the extent of 
damage that will be caused by 'tactical* use Any quick decisive result in a 
war is likely to come out of a battle in Punjab or Kashmir Therefore it is 
this sector of the Indo-Pakistan border which has the highest level of troop 
deployment and it is in this area that tactical nuclear weapons are most likely 
to be used Given the high population density along both sides of the border in 
the Punjab-Kashmir sector, collateral civilian casualties and damage is likely 
to be very high Once use of nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, has caused
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extensive damage and casualties in such border urban centers as Amritsar , 
Gujranwala, Ferozpur, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Srinagar, Fazilka, Baramula, Lahore, 
Sialkot, Kasur, Gujrat, and Jhelum, the chances of escalation into counter—city 
strikes is very high Thus use of tactical nuclear weapons against field 
formations in the Punjab—Kashmir sector would probably be tantamount to a large 
scale exchange between the two parties
Use of tactical nuclear weapons further south along the Rajasthan and 
Gujrat border would not cause widespread collateral civilian casualties because 
of the relatively sparse population along both sides of the border in that 
sector Therefore tactical use of weapons in this sector would not necessarily 
escalate into counter-city strikes The danger however remains that once the 
nuclear threshold is crossed such escalation would occur
The above discussion on use of tactical weapons has assumed that such use 
would be made against military formations of the other side before it crosses 
the border Once forces of one side have crossed the border and occupied 
populated areas of the other, the latter would be placed in a situation wherein 
use of tactical nuclear weapons against the enemy would mean causing the death 
of large numbers of its own population Under such circumstances a country 
might choose to use nuclear weapons as envisaged in Scenario E above m  order to 
force the enemy to stop his advance, and/or vacate occupied territory, rather 
than destroy a large number of its own people The dangers of escalation from 
Scenario E to Scenario D have already been discussed On the other hand if a 
country decides to use tactical nuclear weapons against enemy forces on its own 
territory and incurs substantial civilian casualties in the process, it is 
likely to launch attacks on some of the enemy*s population centers as
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compensation The chances of an escalation to large-scale attacks on civilian 
targets in such a situation is self-evident
Besides the danger pointed out above, two additional factors add to the 
risks of actual use of nuclear weapons if 'tactical' weapons are developed and 
deployed First, it would provide policy makers with what could be perceived as 
an intermediate option between no-use and annihilation, undermining deterrence 
Secondly, and because of the first, it would be easier to make the decision to 
use nuclear weapons in the hope that ’tactical’ use against military targets 
would limit retaliation by the other side to similar levels As we have seen, 
however, once nuclear weapons have been used in any form, all bets as to 
rationality and restraint are likely to be off, creating a dangerous situation 
which could lead to counter-city strikes Such escalation might occur due to 
miscalculation as to the enemy’s real intentions even though only ’tactical* use 
was made of nuclear weapons, or a steady escalation of use of smaller yield 
weapons into use of larger yield weapons
However, the development of nuclear weapons for tactical use is not 
unlikely and is the main danger that would arise from acquisition of such 
weapons by the two sides
Other Constraints
The ultimate conswramt on using nuclear weapons in a situation where both 
sides have them is of course Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) However, other 
international, regional, domestic and geographic constraints, some fairly 
strong, also exist m  South Asia
Use of nuclear weapons in any but the most dire of straits is unlikely 
because of several international and regional factors For India the main
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regional constraint is the China factor Any use of nuclear weapons against 
Pakistan would have to take into consideration the impact on Sino-Indian 
relations Even if China were to stand by and do nothing, such an attack is 
likely to lead to a nuclear arms race with China It is also doubtful if the 
Soviet Union and the United States would stand aside during such a conflict
Then, of course, devastation from a nuclear war would open the door for the 
penetration of outside powers— China, the Soviet Union and the United States—  
into the sub—continent This would further reduce the maneuverability in
international and regional affairs which India, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, 
has so painstakingly acquired over the past decades
Also there is the problem of setting a precedent Small and medium sized 
powers do not want to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons or set precedents 
This is because they would then be open to similar attacks or threats thereof 
from the big powers, whose huge arsenals of nuclear weapons they cannot hope to 
compete with
Yet another constraint on the use of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan 
against each other, one which is often overlooked or underestimated, relates to 
the composition of the population of India Any strikes on major urban centers 
in India would cause many casualties among Indian Muslims who are intermixed 
with the non-Muslim population Table Eight below shows the percentage of 
Muslims m  the population of towns likely to be hit in a counter-city strike of 
the sort outlined in Scenario D above
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TABLE EIGHT
PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS IN POPULATION OF INDIAN TOWNS 
LIKELY TARGETS IN A PAKISTANI COUNTER-CITY STRIKE
CITY POPULATION 
(1990)37
PERCENT
MUSLIMS4^
MUSLIM
POPULATION50
Bombay 11,914,900 14 12 1,682,400
Delhi 9*118,oOO 7 40 674,800
Ahmedabad 3,164,100 14 58 461,300
Agra 1,041,800 16 3« 1 7 0 , 2 0 0
Gowaliar 944,300 15 00 141,600
Jaipur 904,600 18 71 169,300
Baroda 821,400 12 00 98,600
Amritsar 813,500 0 42 3,400
Indore 798,900 12 41 9 9 , 1 0 0
Ludhiana 775,800 0 1 0 800
Surat 693,500 24 00 1 6 6 , 5 0 0
Jullandhar 590,900 0 08 500
Meerut 528,400 39 00 206,100
Jodhpur 467,000 20 00 93,400
Ghaziabad 174,700 24 00 41,900
TOTALS 32,752,400 4,009,900
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A counter-city strike would therefore also kill a large number of Indian 
Muslims Moreover, many areas surrounding the target cities, especially m  
western Uttar Pradesh, have large proportions of Muslims in their population 
Therefore, Muslim casualties from the delayed effects of a nuclear exchange are 
also likely to be high If the Pakistanis were to confine counter-city strikes 
only to those cities in Table Eight above which have few Muslims— Amritsar, 
Ludhiana, Jullandhar— they would be hitting cities so close to their own borders 
that fallout would affect large parts of Punjab, Pakistan's political and 
military core More on this later
It is not the contention here that the Indian Muslim factor would prevent 
an attack on Indian cities, rather, it is argued that it would be a major 
constraint on Pakistani behavior in all but the most severe of crises where the 
very existance of Pakistan was at stake The impact of a nuclear attack on 
India upon Indian Muslims would be a factor which Pakistani decision-makers 
would have to take into consideration for several reasons Among them the more 
important ones are tie ideology behind the creation of Pakistan, the 
maintaining of which is essential for the continued existance of the state, the 
role that Pakistan has sought to play in the Muslim world, the support and 
concern, at least rhetorical, for the Muslims of India expressed by all sections 
of the Pakistani elite, the likely rise in influence of Hindu communal 
organisations in India which would take advantage of heightened anti-Muslim 
sentiments and collapse of law and order to indulge in large-scale killings of 
Muslims, and, last but not least, close familial ties between Indian Muslims and 
Pakistanis of Indian origin (Muhajirs) The latter are an important force in 
Pakistani politics and hold key political and bureaucratic positions Here it 
is important to note that contrary to the arguments made by some Indian
43
analysts, 51 the more conservative, religious and 1 Jihad»-oriented a Pakistani 
government is, the less likely it is to use nuclear weapons against India 
because of the impact, both direct and indirect, such an attack would have on 
Indian Muslims, and on Pakistan*s own position within the Muslim world
On the other hand, Indian Muslims would also be a factor m  the Indian 
government*s calculations if it ever planned to launch a nuclear strike against 
Pakistan We would like to make it very clear here that while the loyalty of 
Indian Muslims to India is not in question, at the same time the fact that 
Indian Muslims have close familial ties with 80% of the population of Pakistan*s 
largest urban center, Karachi, cannot be ignored 52 Again, such considerations 
might restrain rather than prevent Indian decision-makers from using nuclear 
weapons In this regard it is worthy to note that in past conflicts between the 
two countries, some of them very bitter, neither side has resorted to 
indiscriminate attacks on population centers In the case of the 1971 civil war 
in Pakistan, atrocities were committed against fellow Muslim South Asians by the 
Pakistani army The likelihood of this occuring again is not very high, given 
the consequences which followed
The third set of constraints in this section relate to the geographical 
proximity of the two states and various meteorological factors The close 
physical proximity of the two states makes it inevitable that fallout from 
nuclear explosions m  one would effect the territory of the other The 
heartland of Pakistan— the Indus Valley region of Pakistani Punjab——runs 
parallel to the strategic, rich, and now restless state of Punjab in India Any 
attack on Pakistani cities in the 'heartland* of Pakistan ( 5 out of 8 cities in 
Table Six fall within this region) would mean that deaths and damage from 
fallout would effect Indian Punjab Similarly, attacks on Indian Punjab cities,
indeed even on Delhi, would result in some fallout deaths and damage in 
Pakistani Punjab The extent of damage would depend on wind direction and 
force, which varies at different times m  the year (see Figure Six below)
FIGURE SIX
WIRD DIRECTION DURING THE NORTH-EAST AND 
SOUTH-WEST MONSOON SEASONS IN SOUTH ASIa 53
We see that during the period of the Northeast Monsoon (December to 
March),5*1 fallout would be carried back to India Similarly, during the 
Southwest Monsoon (June to September).5*1 fallout would be carried back to 
Pakistan Therefore, to prevent damage to itself from fallout from its own 
weapons, India would have to attack during the months of April through October,
45
while Pakistan would have to attack during the months of October through May 
Even without strong winds, damage to the border regions of the two countries 
would be substantial Fallout damage to the two Punjabs would be of great 
economic and political significance if the two countries were to survive as 
states after a nuclear war This would be yet another constraint on the use of 
nuclear weapons for any purpose other than deterrence
It is therefore clear that besides Mutual Assured Destruction other 
constraints exist on use of nuclear weapons in general and on its use for any 
other purpose than deterrence in particular These constraints would play an 
important restraining role At the same time the importance of these 
constraints should not be overestimated The best and most effective constraint 
would still be MAD
As already noted the chances of a strategic nuclear exchange between India 
and Pakistan (provided the conditions necessary to achieve nuclear stability 
outlined above are met) are very low In our opinion the probability of such an 
exchange is about the same as that of a strategic exchange between the USA and 
the USSR The ability of both sides to inflict unacceptable damage on the 
other, indeed, to threaten each other’s survival as states or even civil 
societies, is deterrence enough against such use It would compel both sides to 
limit their ambitions at the expense of the other, and force both elites to end 
exaggerations of external threats to security
The development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, however, would 
sharply increase the chances of use of nuclear weapons Even if such use is 
initially of a limited nature, it is, for reasons already discussed, very likely 
to escalate into major nuclear strikes Thus if nuclear weapons are ever used
by India and Pakistan against each other on a large scale, such use is likely to 
escalate from "tactical use"
CONCLUSIONS
In concluding we would like to restate the parameters within which the 
arguments in this study have been presented and the assumptions that have been 
made It has not studied the probability or possibility of a nuclear weapons 
program m  the two countries, it does not seek to evaluate the technical ability 
of the two states to develop and maintain a nuclear force, it has not discussed 
in detail the role of other powers m  an Indo-Pakistani nuclear equation, it has 
not considered the possibility of the export of a Pakistani "Islamic" bomb 
(which in the opinion of this writer is, at best, an unpersuasive and 
unsubstantiated argument) All these issues have been discussed in some detail 
by others However, after assuming that both countries have acquired nuclear 
weapons and the ability to deliver them, we have estimated the damage likely to 
be caused by several types of nuclear exchanges between India and Pakistan We 
have also examined the likelihood of a nuclear war between the two countries 
In view of the above parameters and assumptions and in light of our 
analysis we reach the following conclusions about the usability of nuclear 
weapons m  South Asia
1 The introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia would not necessarily be
destabilizing, provided that it was not too rapid and asymmetrical in 
nature
2 Nuclear weapons would probably be used to maintain a deterrence posture by
both countries However, four potential problems exist with regard to 
Pakistan1s ability to maintain a stable and credible deterrence
posture its technical backwardness compared to India, the danger of 
it losing the ability to deliver nuclear weapons because of losses 
suffered during conventional warfare, the relatively greater 
vulnerability of Pakistan to Indian attack than of India to Pakistani 
attack, and the need for the two sides to develop C^I These problems 
will have to be overcome to establish credible deterrence 
The use of nuclear weapons for compellence is impractical unless only one 
side had nuclear weapons If both have nuclear weapons, their use to 
compel compromise on vital issues of national interest would not be 
possible
The use of nuclear weapons for compellence by small extremist dissident or 
non-governmental groups cannot be ruled out However, such groups 
could only achieve parochial, not national strategic goals
The major destabilizing effect of nuclear weapons would be caused by any 
policy to use them as "tactical weapons" The adoption of such 
policies and the development of "tactical nuclear weapons" must 
therefore be prevented, if and when the two states acquire nuclear 
weapons
Any use of nuclear weapons, even on a small and limited scale, in the region 
would cause very high civilian casualties and collateral damage This 
is likely to cause escalation from a limited nuclear exchange into a 
major counter-city strike
Besides MAD, other international, regional, domestic and geographic
constraints exist on use of nuclear weapons for any purpose besides 
deterrence These constraints are significant
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Thus the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan will not 
necessarily lead to instability in the region If both sides acquire nuclear 
weapons, a policy of using these for deterrence is established and, if 
rationality and perspective are retained by decision makers in times of crisis, 
acquisition of nuclear weapons may actually lead to more stable relations 
between the two states But it is imperative, if nuclear weapons are introduced 
into the region, that this introduction be gradual and symmetrical and that the 
conditions necessary for a credible and robust deterrence, as discussed above, 
be established
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